Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations. I. Introduction S one of its many responses to the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia accident, 1 NASA decided to develop a formal standard for models and simulations (M&S). 2 Work commenced in May 2005 and an interim version 3 was issued in late 2006. This interim version underwent considerable revision following an extensive Agency-wide review in 2007 followed by some additional revisions as a result of the review by the NASA Engineering Management Board (EMB) in the first half of 2008. The NASA Chief Engineer issued the resulting permanent version of the NASA M&S Standard 4 in July 2008.
The CAIB also made the following Shuttle-specific recommendation: R3.8-2: Develop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models to evaluate Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts. These tools should provide realistic and timely estimates of any impact damage from possible debris from any source that may ultimately impact the Orbiter. Establish impact damage thresholds that trigger responsive corrective action, such as on-orbit inspection and repair, when indicated.
The NASA Administrator chartered an executive team to identify the CAIB report elements with Agency-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. This executive team became known as the Diaz Team. In its general discussion of these issues, the Diaz Team report 2 suggested the following:
All programs should produce, maintain, and validate models to assess the state of their systems and components. These models should be continually updated and validated against experimental and operational data to determine appropriate courses of action and repair. The value of the models should be assessed with respect to their ability to support decision making in a timely way so as not to lead the decision maker to a conflict between costly action versus effective action in the interest of safety or mission success.
Personnel need to be adequately trained in model use, limitations, and escalation procedures when issues arise.
Engineers, when faced with results that defy "reality checks," should double check the model then raise their concerns.
NASA policies recognize requirements for public safety. Those policies should be reviewed and the models used should be continually updated and assessed with respect to value in supporting timely decision making.
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Soon after the release of the CAIB report, the NASA Administrator appointed the Return to Flight Task Group to provide an independent assessment of NASA's actions to implement the recommendations of the CAIB. In July 2005, the Return to Flight Task Group issued their report. 8 Annex A2 contained numerous concerns regarding the use of M&S. The following are some excerpts from that report (the bold face is not in the original but is added here to highlight important points):
Standard engineering practice calls for objectives (requirements and interface definitions) to be established prior to development for any model or system of models, and processes and criteria defined for validating and verifying the model's results…Initially, we did not observe these normal processes being followed during the development of these models…
The uncertainties in one model (or system) inherently feeds into and compounds the uncertainty in the second model (or system), and so on. It appears, however, that NASA largely designed these five classes of models without the attention to the interdependencies between the models necessary for a complete understanding of the end-to-end result.
Understanding the characteristics of, and validating and verifying, one type of model without examining the implications for the end-to-end result is not sufficient…But, as the Columbia accident showed, in a high risk environment that involves many unknowns like human space flight, experience and instinct are poor substitutes for careful analysis of uncertainty.
…during the return-to-flight effort, there has been an enormous expenditure of time and resources-amounting to tens of millions of dollars-without the discipline of a formal development plan, clear objectives, explicit plans for verification and validation, thorough outside review, documented ICDs [interface control documents] between models, or a good understanding of the limitations of analytical systems employing multiple, linked deterministic models.
Validation and verification planning has been left to the end of the process rather than the beginning…Analytical models have essentially driven the return-to-flight effort; however, industry and academic standards and methods for developing, verifying, and validating the models have not been used. In addition, no sensitivity analyses had been conducted and no empirical data from flight history had been incorporated in the models or their validation.
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All three groups-the CAIB, the Return to Flight Task Group, and the Diaz Team-identified a need for NASA to establish greater discipline in its development and usage of models and simulations.
B. Objectives for the NASA M&S Standard
The specific goals stated for the M&S Standard in a memo by the NASA Chief Engineer dated September 1, 2006 were that the M&S Standard will • Ensure that the credibility of M&S results is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions
• Assure that the credibility of M&S meets the project requirements • Establish M&S requirements and recommendations that will form a strong foundation for disciplined (structure, management, control) development, validation and use of M&S within NASA and its contractor community
• Include a standard method to assess the credibility of the M&S presented to the decision-maker when making critical decisions (i.e., decisions that effect human safety or mission success) using results from M&S
• Establish a common set of terms and a uniform way for M&S practitioners to communicate the credibility of
M&S
• Be responsive to Diaz Action #4.
The Diaz Team, in Action #4 from its January 30, 2004 report, 2 explicitly called for NASA to: "Develop a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations." Six specific objectives were associated with Action #4. These objectives are as follows:
1. Identify best practices to ensure that knowledge of operations is captured in the user interfaces (e.g. users are not able to enter parameters that are out of bounds).
2. Develop process for tool verification and validation, certification, re-verification, revalidation, and recertification based on operational data and trending.
3. Develop standard for documentation, configuration management, and quality assurance. 4. Identify any training or certification requirements to ensure proper operational capabilities. 5. Provide a plan for tool management, maintenance, and obsolescence consistent with modeling/simulation environments and the aging or changing of the modeled platform or system. 6. Develop a process for user feedback when results appear unrealistic or defy explanation. 7 Subsequently, the NASA Chief Engineer (then Christopher Scolese) augmented this in an internal memo dated Sept. 1, 2006 , with the additional objective that "the M&S standard will 7. Include a standard method to assess the credibility of the M&S presented to the decision maker when making critical decisions (i.e., decisions that effect human safety or mission success) using results from M&S."
The Chief Engineer's expectation was that the "M&S standard will …establish M&S requirements and recommendations that will form a strong foundation for disciplined (structure, management, control) development, validation and use of M&S within NASA and its contractor community."
As stated in Ref. 4 these seven "objectives are encapsulated in the overall goal for the M&S Standard, which is to ensure that the credibility of the results from M&S is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions.
Critical decisions based on M&S results, as defined by this standard, are those technical decisions related to design, development, manufacturing, ground, or flight operations that may impact human safety or program/project-defined mission success criteria." A discussion of how the standard addresses these is given in Appendix E of Ref. 6.
C. Scope of the NASA M&S Standard
The determination of those M&S that fall within the scope of the NASA M&S Standard is based upon an assessment of the risk that is posed by the use of the M&S. Fig. 1 , taken from appendix A of the NASA M&S Standard, illustrates the approach. Those M&S that are high consequence and high influence are shown in the red boxes in Fig. 1 This relationship is demonstrated in Fig. 2 .
The NASA M&S Standard is an institutional standard under the auspices of the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer; hence, the relevant technical authority is the engineering authority. In general, the (engineering) technical authority is responsible for ensuring that the NASA M&S Standard is employed properly on those NASA programs for which it is applicable. The determination of which M&S fall within scope of the standard using the M&S Risk Assessment is but one example of a responsibility that is shared by the program and the technical authority.
Each of the NASA mission directorates has the programmatic responsibility for several programs. A program typically consists of several projects; in turn, modeling and simulation is but one of the many elements of a project.
Programmatic decisions related to M&S are made at various levels in this hierarchy. In this paper, we usually use the term "project" in the generic sense, referring to the appropriate level in the programmatic hierarchy.
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Another distinct choice that was made was to employ the concepts and language of the modeling and simulation community rather than those of the software engineering or the systems engineering communities. Indeed, many of the concepts and much of the language of modeling and simulation are related to the scientific method, which traces Software verification is a software engineering activity that demonstrates that the software products meet specified requirements.
Software validation is a software engineering activity that demonstrates that the as-built software product or software product component satisfies its intended use in its intended environment. NASA-STD-7009 (reflects M&S perspective)
The process of determining that a computational model accurately represents the underlying mathematical model and its solution from the perspective of the intended uses of M&S.
The process of determining the degree to which a model or a simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or the simulation.
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These definitions are context dependent and reflect accepted practices within each community. For both the systems engineering and the software engineering communities, verification entails testing against product specifications, and validation entails determining whether the product is sufficient for the intended use. Both of these result in a "yes" or "no" decision, i.e., either the product (systems engineering) or software (software engineering) meets specifications or it does not. For the M&S community, the verification process includes testing to determine how well a computational model represents the underlying mathematical model and the validation process includes testing to determine how well the model represents the real world. M&S verification and validation is an ongoing process; it generally does not result in a "yes" or "no" decision. The NASA M&S Standard did not address how to meet the requirements because the field of M&S, especially verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification, has not reached maturity, and new and better approaches could be developed as the field matures. Balci 21 also includes attributes as metrics that don't directly affect credibility, such as efficiency, interoperability, and maintainability, and requires an assessment of the process that is used to create the product throughout its life cycle; this feature would not be possible with commercial, off-the-shelf software for M&S.
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Critical decisions that are based entirely or partially on M&S are usually made within the context of a project and are often based on a combination of factors including several M&S results. The decision maker, having an overarching view of the project, has the responsibility for accepting the M&S results with full awareness of their impact on the whole project. Credible results play a crucial role in the process. To facilitate the decision, the practitioners report the results in a transparent manner, thus ensuring the repeatability, robustness, and traceability of the reported results. The magnitudes and confidence levels of the uncertainties are needed to make risk assessments and to make compromises, if need be, in the decision.
More details on the fundamental approach to the NASA M&S Standard are given in Sect. 7.2.4. of Zang et al. 6
IV. Overview of Requirements
The requirements section consists of 49 requirements, which are organized into eight subsections. The first seven subsections (4.1-4.7) provide the underlying activities for the eighth subsection (4.8), "Reporting of M&S results to decision makers," which is the main emphasis of the standard. The first seven subsections set requirements mainly to establish the type of information that needs to be collected so that it can be effectively communicated to those making decisions. A complete list of the requirements and their traceability to the seven objectives given in section II of this paper can be found in Zang et al. 6 This section summarizes the main points.
Thirty-three of the requirements start with the words "shall document." Twelve of these (i.e., 4.1.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.8, 4.3.6, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4-4.4.9) are to be interpreted as meaning that the activity in question is not required per se, but that whatever was done is to be documented, and if nothing was done a clear statement to that effect is to be documented.
The first requirements subsection (4.1) addresses programmatic activities. The most fundamental activity is for project management, in collaboration with the technical authority, to identify and document the critical decisions that are to be addressed with M&S and determine which M&S are within the scope of the NASA M&S Standard.
The latter determination should be based upon the risk that is posed by the anticipated use of the M&S (see Fig. 1 above and the related discussion). These requirements oblige the project to 1) identify the M&S that are in scope, 2) define the objectives and requirements for the M&S, and 3) develop a plan for the acquisition, development, operation, maintenance, and/or retirement of the M&S.
The term "limits of operation" is defined as "the boundary of the set of parameters for which an M&S result is acceptable based on the program/project-required outcomes of verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification." This requirement is driven by objective 1 of Diaz Action #4. Its purpose is to ensure that documentation is available so that those groups that are developing models and conducting simulations can take reasonable precautions to assure that simulations are not conducted with parameters that are out of bounds for the models. The following requirement ensures that the decision maker is informed if no guarantee that the simulation was indeed performed within the limits of operation of the model is available.
Req. 4.3.1-Shall do either of the following:
a. Ensure that simulations are conducted within the limits of operation of the model, or b. Placard the simulation and analysis results with a warning that the simulation may have been conducted outside the limits of operation and include the type of limit that may have been exceeded, the extent that the limit might have been exceeded, and an assessment of the consequences of this action on the M&S results.
Requirements 4.2.5 and 4.3.1 tie to findings F6.3-10, F6.3-11, and F6.3-13 of the CAIB report and to objective 1 of Diaz Action #4; both of these findings and the associated Diaz action are a result of the Crater case study that was previously described in section 2.
Req. 4.2.7-Shall document guidance on proper use of the model. "Guidance on proper use of a model includes descriptions of appropriate practices for set-up, execution, and analysis of results." Often models are complicated enough that the correct use is not obvious. For example, codes may only work properly on certain platforms with certain compilers; model options may need to be tailored specifically to the application of interests; or output from codes may need to be post-processed in order to be analyzed properly. Mistakes at any point in the execution of the model or the analysis of the output can produce invalid results. To help prevent these types of errors, the standard processes from model setup, execution, and analysis of results need to be documented.
Req. 4.5.1-Shall identify and document any Recommended Practices that apply to M&S for the program/project. The standard was written to address issues that are broadly applicable to M&S and, as such, implementation details that are specific to particular disciplines, codes, or projects were purposely excluded. These details are typically embodied in recommended practices guides. Recommended practices are generally expected to evolve faster than overarching governance from the standard, as these practices are more closely coupled to M&S technological advances. Requirement 4.5.1 is designed to assure that applicable recommended practices are identified and documented. As stated previously, the main goal of the standard is to ensure that the decision maker is made aware of the key information regarding M&S results that is needed to infer their credibility. The information needed was broken down into three parts: the uncertainty of the results, the assessment on the scale, and any caveats that go along with the results. Requirement 4.8.2 prescribes that an explicit statement be made on the uncertainty in the results.
However, this requirement leaves the presenter with the option of stating that no uncertainty estimate is available.
This option is provided because circumstances (time pressure during mission operations or absence of uncertainty estimation capability) may preclude such estimates. Requirements 4.8.1 and 4.8.3 ensure that the decision maker has the information that is needed to determine the trustworthiness of the results including the uncertainty estimation. At this point, the decision maker must determine how much weight to give the M&S results.
VI. Recommendations for Maturation
As the NASA M&S Standard was being completed, its authors recognized that follow-on activities to the standard development would enhance the usefulness of the standard to agency M&S development and operations. 
R-6. Information regarding credibility assessment scale usage should be collected to determine effectiveness and
provide data for further revision. In general, scales measuring the rigor, credibility, or similar aspects of M&S results have not received much use, and there is no consensus on such assessments. In particular, the credibility assessment scale in the M&S Standard has not been used. The immaturity of this particular field necessitates close monitoring of the impact of credibility assessment scale usage by NASA programs and the use of that information to update the credibility 21 Consequence classifications assess the impact of a decision that proves incorrect. The number of Consequence levels and most of the language is taken from NPR 8000.4. The last item in each class description has been added to address impact upon mission success criteria, such as science objectives. a. Class IV -Negligible. A poor decision may result in the need for minor first aid treatment but would not adversely affect personal safety or health; damage to facilities, equipment, or flight hardware more than normal wear and tear level; internal schedule slip that does not impact internal development milestones; cost overrun less than 2 percent of planned cost; all mission success criteria met, with at worst minor performance degradations.
b. Class III -Moderate. A poor decision may result in minor injury or occupational illness, or minor property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; internal schedule slip that does not impact launch date; cost overrun between 2 percent and not exceeding 15 percent of planned cost; a few (up to 25 percent) mission success criteria not met due to performance degradations.
c. Class II -Critical. A poor decision may result in severe injury or occupational illness, or major property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; schedule slippage causing launch date to be missed; cost overrun between 15 percent and not exceeding 50 percent of planned; many (between 25 percent and 75 percent) mission success criteria not met due to substantial performance degradations. d. Class I -Catastrophic. A poor decision may result in death or permanently disabling injury, facility destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle during the mission; schedule slippage causing launch window to be missed; cost overrun greater than 50 percent of planned cost; most (more than 75 percent) mission success criteria not met due to severe performance degradations. e. Influence 5 -Controlling. M&S results are the controlling factor in some program/project decisions. Neither flight nor test data are available for essential aspects of the system and/or the environment.
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